Evidence Neutrality and the Moral Value of Information

Published in Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, 2019

Recommended citation: Askell, Amanda. ‘Evidence Neutrality and the Moral Value of Information’. In Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, edited by Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/effective-altruism-9780198841364

In this chapter, I consider whether there is a case for favoring interventions whose effectiveness has stronger evidential support, when expected effectiveness is equal. I argue that in fact the reverse is true: when expected value is equal one should prefer to invest in interventions that have less evidential support, on the grounds that by doing so one can acquire evidence of their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) that may then be valuable for future investment decisions.

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Recommended citation: Askell, Amanda. ‘Evidence Neutrality and the Moral Value of Information’. In Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, edited by Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

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